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A DEFENSE OF THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE:
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THIS CONFLICT BETWEEN
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC GOOD AND A
PREDICTION FOR ITS FUTURE
ANDREW PARSLOW*
INTRODUCTION
Since man first left the state of nature and formed property rights,
there have been issues when states desire to use the property of another for
what they consider to be the greater good. In their wisdom, the Founding
Fathers of the United States built on centuries of historical principles rang-
ing from the Romans to the English and enshrined in the Fifth Amend-
ment the common law notion that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”1 The rise of environmentalism
has brought a new frontier to the ancient struggle between the rights of
individuals and the rights of the government over private property as
new types of regulation unforeseen by the Founders raise questions, such
as what constitutes a taking and for what actions must the government
provide compensation.
On the forefront of these arguments regarding the scope of the
Fifth Amendment is the regulatory takings doctrine. The first major case
to draw attention to the view that severe regulation can amount to a
taking was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2 In Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court found that a state act that banned the mining of anthracite coal,
if doing so would destabilize human habitation, could not retroactively deny
a party’s contracted mining rights to a plot of land.3 More importantly,
it introduced the view that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
uncompensated takings applies to a decrease in value from regulation.4
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2020. Florida State University, 2017. I
would like to thank Justice Arthur Kelsey for the invaluable lessons he taught me about
the use of historical analysis in legal writing. I would also like to thank the staff of the
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review for all their hard work.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5.
2 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
3 Id. at 415–16.
4 Id. at 415.
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This is an issue of grave importance for environmental regulation,
for if the government is required to compensate every landowner whose
property loses value from a regulation, then they will quickly become pro-
hibitively expensive or, at the very least, highly unpopular due to their
cost. Much ink has been spilled on this issue; however, the vast majority of
environmental law literature opposes it.5 There is a wide spectrum of op-
position, ranging from other nations’ standards to application difficulties.6
Of particular note is the argument that the Founding Fathers never in-
tended for the takings doctrine to apply to a decrease in value due to
regulation.7 If this statement were true, then the argument for a constitu-
tional requirement to compensate regulatory takings is greatly weakened.
Due to the fact that courts have been upholding regulatory takings
claims, the balancing of a constitutional right (security in one’s property),
and the serious potential ramifications for environmental law, it would
be a shame for the issue to only be explored from one angle. In this Note,
I will argue in favor of the regulatory takings doctrine, particularly that,
while environmental regulation was not foreseen by the Framers, had they
known, they would have intended for the Fifth Amendment to cover regula-
tory takings. This analysis will be done through the lens of Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England.8 Introduction, Section 2 of the
Commentaries addresses the ideal manner in which to interpret the mean-
ing of a law or doctrine.9 Since the influence of Blackstone on the drafters
of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights cannot be disputed, this
should provide an accurate reflection of how it was expected to be inter-
preted. This argument will be further augmented by background historical
sources and events that clearly had an influence on the drafting of the
Fifth Amendment and can shine a better light onto its intent.
As explained by Blackstone, there are five tiers which should be
used to interpret the “will of the legislator” when an amendment was
drafted.10 First, through the plain meaning of the wording of the statute.11
5 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90 (1995); Nestor Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Tak-
ings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 54 (2008); Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Con-
stitutional Interpretation Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
247, 247 (2015).
6 See sources cited supra note 5.
7 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 247.
8 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 2014).
9 Id. at 59.
10 Id. at 59–61.
11 Id. at 59.
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Second, through context by analyzing other parts of the document as well
as similar documents by the same drafters.12 Third, the meaning of the
words in regard to the purpose of the amendment.13 Fourth, considering
hypothetical situations that will result from its application.14 Finally, by
simply trying to understand the reasoning behind the law.15
Part I will address the historical background of eminent domain,
starting with its inherent roots in the establishment of property rights
in English common law under Henry II, to the place it held in the minds
of the men responsible for the drafting of the American Takings Clause.16
Part II will be composed of a five-tier analysis of the doctrine in the man-
ner prescribed by Blackstone.17 Part III will address how best to interpret
the results of the analysis in Part II and to consider it for future environ-
mental regulation.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
A. Property Rights and Early English Common Law
In order to fully understand the reasoning behind the Fifth Amend-
ment’s guarantee of just compensation for loss of land, one has to look all
the way back to the birth of Anglo-American jurisprudence. When William
the Conqueror was laying the groundwork for his eventual successor,
Henry II, to create the common law, one of his earliest acts after unifying
England was to survey the land to determine who owned what.18 When
Henry II took the throne, England had fallen into disarray.19 In order to
restore order and placate the English, Henry II created the common law,
basing it off the framework that was present on the island from local
customs with some alterations.20 His legal advancement that is most
relevant to this Note was the creation of juries to replace trial by combat
or trial by ordeal for land disputes.21 Through implementing trial by law
12 Id. at 60.
13 Id.
14 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 60.
15 Id. at 61.
16 WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE BIRTH OF
BRITAIN 162 (Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1956).
17 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 59.
18 Domesday Book, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Domes
day-Book [https://perma.cc/L7VU-L69A] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
19 CHURCHILL, supra note 16, at 199.
20 Id. at 199–200, 215.
21 Id. at 217–20.
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and other measures to smoothen the manner in which disputes are settled,
Henry II created the first property laws in Anglo-American jurisprudence.22
So ingrained was the notion of property rights, especially for land, that
the earliest notions which resembled rights in Anglo-American law were
to land.23
The formal notion of rights, strong enough to bind the sovereign,
enter our jurisprudence under Henry II’s son, King John I, with the Magna
Carta.24 There are two things about this eight-centuries-old document
that are of great importance to our interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.25 First, of the sixty-three provisions in the Magna Carta, almost
half address land rights or other rights that also involve land.26 Second,
Article 19 of the Magna Carta states, “No constable or his bailiff is to take
[] chattels from anyone [] unless the constable or his bailiff immediately
offers money in payment of obtains a respite by the wish of the seller.”27
Article 19 still allows for the sovereign’s right to eminent domain; however,
it explicitly calls for payment if the state takes an individual’s property.28
This eight-hundred-year-old legal document is the progenitor of our
Takings Clause and reflects the critical association between land and the
rights of individuals in early legal minds.29
B. Enlightenment Influences on the Framers
While medieval English law was clearly an influence on the Fram-
ers, they also faced more modern influences from the Enlightenment that
was sweeping the Western World.30 This movement resurrected ancient
Greco-Roman notions and concerns of reason and happiness, which had an
influence on the great legal and philosophical minds of the time.31 There
22 Id.
23 See id. at 216–17.
24 Magna Carta, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Magna
-Carta [https://perma.cc/8G8S-4VZ5] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
25 Id.
26 Magna Carta, 16 Jon. I, chs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 23, 31, 32, 34, 37, 43, 46,
47, 52, 53, 56 (1215).
27 Magna Carta, 10 Hen. III, ch. 19 (1225). This quote is from a later version of the Magna
Carta issued by Henry III; however, its Article 19 better summarizes the ideas present
in the original’s Articles 28, 30, and 31.
28 Id.
29 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 24.
30 Enlightenment, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Enlight
enment-European-history [https://perma.cc/R22Y-LW4C] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
31 Id.
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were two enlightenment thinkers in particular who were of great influ-
ence to the drafters of the Constitution: John Locke and Sir William
Blackstone.32
Locke claimed that all property rights are derived from a man’s
ownership of his own body.33 In his philosophy, man has absolute owner-
ship of his mind and body.34 If he uses what he owns to improve the un-
changed state of nature, it becomes his by virtue of him improving it.35 He
then expresses his own view on the social contract in which governments
are willingly formed solely for the purpose of protecting the lives and
property of the individuals who formed it.36
Blackstone’s views on land ownership and the common law were
very clear, “the law of the land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to the
sacred and inviolable rights of private property.”37 In his view, the ever
impalpable common law had a clear-cut rule that no matter the cause,
land cannot be taken by the government without just compensation.38 In
many ways, the Enlightenment served to calcify the medieval notion in
the common law of rights to one’s property, making it more tangible and
useful for the Founders of the United States.
II. BLACKSTONE’S FIVE-TIERED APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
A. Usual and Most Known Significance of the Words
The first step Blackstone offers to divine the “will of the legislator”
is to look at the plain meaning of the text itself.39 The text of the Takings
Clause states, “[(1)] private property [shall not] [(2)] be taken [(3)] for public
use, [(4)] without just compensation.”40 For the sake of brevity and sim-
plicity, this Note will cede elements 3 and 4. Numerous cases and papers
have dealt with the issue of what constitutes “public use” and under
32 While the Enlightenment had numerous great minds who had an influence on the
Founders, many of whom who were lawyers, the scope of this Note requires the analysis
be limited to these two outstanding influences.
33 George H. Smith, John Locke: The Justification of Private Property, LIBERTARIANISM
.ORG (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/john-locke-justification-pri
vate-property [https://perma.cc/A9MD-4SFG].
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 135.
38 Id. at 134–35.
39 Id. at 59.
40 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5.
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what criteria one must use to determine “just compensation.”41 For the
sake of argument, this Note will assume that environmental regulation
is a public use and a valid reason to take property. It will also adopt the
assumption that if a regulation is found to be a taking, the compensation
will be just. The far more interesting and relevant points to address here
are “private property” and “[shall not] be taken.”42
Purely based on word use, what constitutes private property?
Merriam-Webster defines private as “intended for or restricted to the use
of a particular person, group, or class.”43 It also defines property as “some-
thing owned or possessed specifically: a piece of real estate.”44 It is safe
to assume that any commonly used dictionary would yield similar results.
In this case, the common English meaning would be a thing, particularly
land, that certain people can restrict others from using. This seems to
perfectly align with the well-known legal metaphor of the bundle of rights.45
When one adds private to property, the common language use suggests
a meaning in concurrence with the legal understanding of the right to
restrict other’s uses of the property as the true right to private property,
not just control of the mere physical plot of land.
The same logic can be applied to “be taken.”46 Merriam-Webster
defines “take” as, “to get into one’s hands or into one’s possession, power,
or control.”47 The common meaning of “take” would suggest that some-
thing can be taken both physically, “one’s possession” and figuratively,
“[within] one’s . . . power, or control.”48
If someone were to combine the plain meaning of the various
elements of the Takings Clause discussed above, they would get: the Fed-
eral Government49 shall not remove an individual’s ability to determine
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Private, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/private [https://
perma.cc/M6QE-YCH5] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
44 Property, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/property
[https://perma.cc/WV33-FUDW] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
45 Carlos Kelly, What’s a Bundle of Sticks and Why Should You Care?, LEGAL SCOOP ON
SOUTHWEST FLA. REAL ESTATE (June 9, 2016), https://www.legalscoopswflre.com/eminent-do
main/whats-a-bundle-of-sticks-and-why-should-you-care/ [https://perma.cc/DK3N-VYDX].
46 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5.
47 Take, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/take [https://
perma.cc/P4SF-XXGN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
48 Id.
49 Since the Fifth Amendment was written solely to limit the federal government, it is
referred to in my plain meaning interpretation of the Takings Clause; however, in ap-
plication, it would still apply equally to the states under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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the uses of their land either through physically possessing the land or by
claiming that ability for themselves. This plain language reading supports
the notion that by restricting an individual’s ability to use the land as
they see fit, a part of their ability to determine its use, then they are taking
private property. This view concurs with the notion of regulatory takings.
B. Meaning of the Words from Context
If the first approach does not adequately explain the “will of the leg-
islator” in a particular document, then Blackstone proscribes examining
their meaning through the context of the document itself as well as similar
works by the same legislature.50 Since the Constitution was drafted by what
Jefferson referred to as “an assembly of demigods,” all of whom had a wide
range of impressive credentials, educations, and opinions, it would be
rather difficult to discern the meaning of this bundle of compromises by
looking at the drafters’ independent writings.51 This shortens the scope of
analysis to the Preamble to the Constitution, the various articles found
within the document, and the other amendments that make up the Bill
of Rights.52
The Preamble is a logical starting point since the role of a preamble
is to state the purpose of a document. The Constitution’s Preamble reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquil-
ity, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America.53
The relevant principles for the Takings Clause would be “establish Justice,”
“promote the general Welfare,” and “secure the Blessings of Liberty.”54
These goals fall on both sides of the debate. On the one hand, “Justice” and
“Liberty” would tend to support a strong view of property rights, while
“general Welfare” would favor allowing the government to override these
50 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 60.
51 An Assembly of Demigods, NAT’L CTR. FOR CONST. STUD., https://nccs.net/blogs/articles
/an-assembly-of-demigods [https://perma.cc/YF9L-V2RS] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
52 While it is true that the Bill of Rights was not written with the rest of the Constitution,
these documents share an author, and the amendments were intended to be used in tandem
with the Constitution.
53 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
54 See id.
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rights when necessary for the good of society.55 While what exactly Jus-
tice is has been argued for several millennia, common elements in the
Western Philosophical tradition tend to be strict adherence to the law
and the protection of the rights of citizens.56 Liberty is an equally
nebulous term, which seems to have lost a distinctive meaning over the
years.57 It is rooted from Latin “Liber,” which translates to free, which
means that in the very least liberty can be understood to mean freedom
from some degree of restraint on an individual’s actions.58 The phrase
“general Welfare” was lifted directly from the Articles of Confederation,
and James Madison claimed that it was to serve a limited purpose and
expressly warned of its overuse.59 In some cases, the courts have taken
Madison’s view such as United State v. Butler, which shot down an agri-
cultural spending program as beyond the boundaries set forth in the
Constitution.60 For the most part, the predominant view has been Alex-
ander Hamilton’s, that as long as the use is directed towards a vague
common good, then it is allowable.61
General Welfare, as it is commonly used, is strongly in favor of un-
compensated government regulations, since as stipulated earlier such
regulation serves to benefit the general public. Liberty, on the other hand,
would support regulatory takings as it would imply protection from overly
intrusive government action, the generally accepted reason for the revo-
lution that led to the writing of the document in the first place.62 Justice,
if interpreted as protecting individual rights, would likely be on the side
55 See id.
56 Edward Younkins, Justice in a Free Society, LIBERTY FREE PRESS (Mar. 15, 2000), http://
www.quebecoislibre.org/younkins27.htm [https://perma.cc/D9BA-8A73]. While there are
numerous, fascinating non-Western interpretations of justice, for the sake of an analysis
of the intent of this Western document written by men with limited awareness to these
other views, all that is necessary is the Western interpretation.
57 Carl Eric Scott, The Five Conceptions of American Liberty, NAT’L AFF. (Summer 2014),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-five-conceptions-of-american
-liberty [https://perma.cc/HWY3-ZUBL].
58 Liberty, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/liberty
[https://perma.cc/Z4PT-L8DB] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
59 See Mike Maharrey, James Madison Refutes Expansive Reading of the General Welfare
Clause, TENTH AMEND. CTR. (July 18, 2018), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2018/07
/18/james-madison-refutes-expansive-reading-of-the-general-welfare-clause/ [https://per
ma.cc/HCD7-PP8R].
60 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 53, 68 (1936).
61 General Welfare, FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, https://legal-dictionary.thefreediction
ary.com/General+Welfare [https://perma.cc/DK3H-AU7V] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
62 American Revolution, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event
/American-Revolution [https://perma.cc/5NXG-C39N] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
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of regulatory takings.63 This is especially true given that at the time of
the writing of the Constitution, private property was held to be one of the
highest of individual rights and as Blackstone put it “sacred and inviola-
ble.”64 If the more modern use of rights is taken, this point loses much of
its strength, as in the modern age we have a very wide variety of rights
of which property is but one of many.65
The articles of the Constitution itself can also be examined to give
insight into the meaning of the Takings Clause and how far it should be
extended. Property is only directly addressed twice within the body of the
document in Article III, Section 3 and Article IV, Section 3.66 Article III,
Section 3 limits the power of the government to prevent the heirs to some-
one convicted of treason to inherit their property.67 Article IV, Section 3
is of little relevance as it involves property belonging to the United States,
not individual citizens.68 Article I, Section 8 further addresses the power
to act on behalf of the general welfare; however, it is primarily dealing with
Congress’s power to spend, not exercise eminent domain or regulate.69
The other Amendments to the Constitution contained in the Bill
of Rights hold greater probative value than the articles in the text itself.
While none of them address land in particular or personal property, they
all follow a common trend.70 They are all negative rights rather than posi-
tive ones.71 Negative rights say what a government can not do, while posi-
tive rights say what it must do.72 Since positive rights did not develop until
after World War II, the Founding Fathers would have understood rights
only to be protections against what the government can do.73 Most actions
taken in the name of environmental protection which would cause an issue
with the regulatory takings doctrine would fall under positive rights.74
63 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
64 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 140.
65 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
Of its thirty articles, only article 17 protects property. It also extends protection only so
far as guaranteeing a right to own property and not have it “arbitrarily” taken.
66 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
67 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
68 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
70 See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
71 See id.
72 Negative vs. Positive Rights, GLOBALIZATION 101, http://www.globalization101.org/nega
tive-vs-positive-rights/ [https://perma.cc/652G-49HN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
73 Three Generation of Human Rights, GLOBALIZATION 101, http://www.globalization101
.org/three-generations-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/9LK9-K3UT] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
74 Id.
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Since, the Bill of Rights seems to be a highly negative document, whose
primary purpose is to limit government action, it clearly reflects a prefer-
ence for inaction over action in order to protect individual rights.75 This
emphasis on inaction out of fear of harming rights would support the view
that the Founders would disfavor regulatory actions that threaten an
individual’s right to their private property.76
Like the first tier, the second supports the notion of regulatory
takings. The Preamble highlights three purposes for the document: justice,
the general welfare, and liberty.77 With this meaning, the drafters most
likely understood justice and liberty would require compensation for regu-
lation, while general welfare, if taken liberally, would not.78 While an
analysis of the body of the Constitution, unfortunately, provides little light
on the issue, an analysis of the other Amendments in the Bill of Rights
further supports regulatory takings. The Bill of Rights follows a theme
of limiting the actions of the federal government to protect cherished
negative rights.79 This strong emphasis on negative rights and limited
government would imply that all ten, including the fifth, should be applied
in the manner that provides the most protection to these rights at the
expense of government power.
C. Understanding of the Words with Regard to Their Purpose
The next tier of analysis prescribed by Blackstone is to discern the
general purpose of the clause and examine its words in the light most
aligned with that purpose.80 Discerning the purpose of the Takings Clause
involves much of the analysis previously discussed in Section B as well
as a cursory glance at the time in which this document was drafted. Once
the purpose of the clause is discerned, its text and application should be
read in the manner most consistent with this purpose.81
As shown in the previous subsection, the original purpose of the
Constitution and its first ten Amendments is to further justice, the general
welfare, and liberty primarily through the use of negative rights.82 This
view is further strengthened through a basic understanding of the events
that led up to its drafting.
75 See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
76 Id.
77 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
78 Id.
79 U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
80 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 60.
81 Id.
82 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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Prior to the drafting of the Constitution, the infant United States
had won its independence from the British Empire.83 Like any conflict,
the Revolution was the result of a myriad of factors; however, it is gener-
ally accepted that the primary cause was opposition to increased British
control of the American Colonies after their halcyon days when the British
let the colonies largely operate independently.84 This increased control
was particularly heinous because it denied the colonists the rights they
had as Englishmen under the common law.85 Since the Constitution was
birthed from a conflict that was a reaction to violations of the colonists’
common law rights, it can safely be assumed that it should not also
oppose those same rights.86 This history would suggest that an interpre-
tation of the Constitution under the third tier of analysis would require
a view of the words in a meaning that is consistent with common law
rights prior to the document’s drafting.
The Takings Clause states, “private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”87 The negative law preference
interpretation would suggest a reading of this clause would have to favor
the negative right of property over the more positive right of a clean en-
vironment.88 This interpretation would require the government to com-
pensate for loss of value.
The historical view that the Constitution would have to uphold
the rights established under the common law is a little more complex.
The problem with this approach is that the English common law did not
include eminent domain because it was not needed.89 The reasons for this
being that after William the Conqueror seized control of the island, the
Crown owned all the land in England.90 Perhaps because the king owned
all land, the common law allowed for different people to own various in-
terests in the same piece of land, the bundle of rights view.91 Despite the
83 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 62.
84 Id.
85 See Rights of Englishmen in British America, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/ex
hibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/rights-of-englishmen-in-british-america.html
[https://perma.cc/A843-VR8U] (last visited Apr. 2, 2020).
86 Richard Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies, 30 AM. L.
REG. 553, 554 (1882).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5. As before, for the sake of brevity only parts 1 and 2 will be
focused on.
88 GLOBALIZATION 101, supra note 72.
89 William D. McNulty, The Power of “Compulsory Purchase” Under the Law of England,
21 YALE L.J. 639, 640 (1912).
90 Id.
91 Kelly, supra note 45. This view is a common metaphor that has become a term of art
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king having an ownership interest, over time the common law grew to hold
a deep respect for “the sacred and inviolable rights of private property.”92
If the clause is interpreted with the purpose of protecting the rights
the former colonists had as Englishmen, then the deference for private
property, especially land, would entail a broad interpretation over what
constitutes property and what constitutes taking. Since the English com-
mon law favored strong protections on real property when everyone only
had partial interest to their land, then only losing a partial interest in
land should still be interpreted as a taking.93 This broad definition of taking
coupled with the respect the early English had for land rights would cer-
tainly support the view that the Founders would have required reparations
for a regulatory taking.
D. Will the Application of an Interpretation Result in an Absurd
Hypothetical?
The next tier in the analysis is whether or not the consequences
of applying the rule would be absurd.94 Blackstone explains this means
of interpretation through an analogy to an old law from Bologna.95 This
law prohibited drawing another’s blood in the street.96 This tier of analysis
would rule that a doctor could still perform an emergency operation on
someone in the street even if it meant drawing his blood since it is highly
unlikely that the lawmakers intended to punish a doctor for saving some-
one’s life under a law clearly intended to prevent harm to people’s safety.97
This standard becomes less useful when the application of the
statutes is not as obviously absurd as Blackstone’s example.98 During the
eighteenth century, environmentalism as we know it did not exist.99 While
humans had already caused drastic climate shifts during the Roman Warm
Period and the Medieval Warm Period, mankind had yet to understand
within the legal profession. This source in particular was selected for its good job in
explaining the phrase.
92 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 135.
93 See McNulty, supra note 89, at 649.
94 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 60.
95 Id.
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98 See id.
99 ERIN L. GORDON, THE AM. CTR., HISTORY OF THE MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
IN AMERICA (June 2012), https://photos.state.gov/libraries/mumbai/498320/fernandesma
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its effect on the environment.100 As previously discussed, the Founders
were influenced by a legal tradition with a strong emphasis on property
rights, so there is a chance that they would find not requiring compensa-
tion for serious regulation which devalues property to be absurd. How
they would react to modern environmental issues is extremely difficult
to predict since they had no exposure to modern regulations or environ-
mental issues.101 These factors make tier four unfortunately not particu-
larly useful in this analysis.
E. The Spirit of the Law
The final tier of analysis is assessing the spirit of the law, which
Blackstone describes as the “most universal and effectual way of
discovering the true meaning of a law[.]”102 Under this approach, similar
to tiers two and three, one must discern why a particular statute is in
place and apply the statute in the manner that best supports the intent or
spirit behind the statute.103 It is for this interpretation of the law that
Blackstone claims legal equity exists.104 He goes on to explain that this
tier is to be used on a case by case basis when there is some wiggle room
in the law for the judge’s discretion.105 While this tier has the most po-
tential leeway in its interpretation, Blackstone does warn that overuse
of this mode of interpretation will “destroy all law, and leave the decision
of every question entirely in the breast of the judge.”106
As discussed in Section B, the text of the constitution suggests
that the spirit of the Fifth Amendment would further justice, the general
welfare, and liberty with a preference for negative rights.107 Section C
showed a strong desire to protect common law rights and land rights
through the historical background of the Amendment’s drafting. Both of
these sections supported the notion that the government must compen-
sate for devalued land; however, tier five’s view of the spirit of preserving
land rights may allow for more malleable conclusions when the rights of
other landowners are threatened.
100 James Taylor, Global Cooling, Not Global Warming, Doomed the Ancients, FORBES
(May 29, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2014/05/29/global-cooling-not
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This can be illustrated with the tort of public nuisance, which comes
from the English common law.108 A public nuisance arises when an indi-
vidual uses their property in a way that is detrimental to the public.109
The poster child for public nuisance is environmental pollution such as
“harm to a natural resource [] aris[ing] from contamination of water-
ways.”110 Tortfeasors who commit public nuisances often face the equitable
remedy of an injunction forcing them to cease their detrimental activity.111
Public nuisances and injunctions are not deemed unconstitutional de-
spite imposing a limitation on an individual’s use of property.112 This
serves the spirit of the law under Section B because it protects the rights
of individuals, including to their real property, even if it is from other indi-
viduals’ use of their property. It also serves the spirit as discussed in Sec-
tion C, since this was a pre-existing remedy under English common law.113
The same special situation is true of the common law tort of
trespass.114 If anyone invades another’s property, then they are liable for
damages regardless of intent.115 This includes an individual’s air rights
and can be used to punish a tortfeasor who uses his land to produce pollu-
tion that enters another’s land.116
The existence of torts such as public nuisance and trespass, which
can allow for the granting of injunctions, suggests that the law does not
see regulation of one’s use of their land to protect another’s rights to be
a taking.117 This would suggest that the intent of the Fifth Amendment
was not to be so draconian as to make any necessary regulation of land
impossible. It would instead support the conclusion that such regulation
is admissible if it is for the sake of protecting the material rights of
others and their land.
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III. HOW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION SHOULD GO FORWARD WITH
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
A. Cautious Regulating
Blackstone’s interpretation of the Takings Clause and the history
leading up to its drafting support the notion that if the government se-
verely restricts the use of someone’s property, then it has performed a
taking. This does not, however, spell the end of environmental regulation
as we know it. Not all regulations on property have been found to be
takings, such as the court’s finding in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.118 In Penn Central, the Supreme Court ruled that im-
posing landmark laws to preserve the edifice of Penn Central Station did
not amount to a taking despite limiting the use of the property.119 In doing
so, the Court imposed a three-part test to determine takings.120 First,
how severe was the economic impact on the regulated property?121 Sec-
ond, did the regulation interfere with investment backed expectations?122
Finally, did the regulation further a legitimate government interest?123
The Penn Central test would still allow for government regulation as long
as the government is more conscientious of when its action would consti-
tute a taking.124 This is arguably the most desirable outcome since it
would both allow for necessary regulation and require that regulators
carefully consider their impact on private property rights.
B. Make a Greater Use of Torts
As discussed in the fifth tier of the Blackstone analysis of the Fifth
Amendment, trespass and public nuisances do not interfere with the Tak-
ings Clause.125 Both existed since before the Constitution and were never
deemed contrary to it.126 Prior to modern environmental regulation, if
118 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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120 Id. at 124.
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U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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your neighbor’s activities were harming your resources, you filed for an
injunction under nuisance law.127 While a complete abandonment of gov-
ernment environmental regulation would not be desirable, more actions
to empower and encourage communities to oppose polluting tortfeasors
may be a desirable reaction to regulatory takings.
This approach works in cases where people are directly affected;
however, it does encounter issues in regard to standing. Environmental is-
sues that affect animals but not humans would be unable to be addressed
through torts, since as expressed in Naruto v. Slater, animals cannot have
standing to sue.128 This means that for some issues, environmental regu-
lation would still be necessary for wildlife preservation.129
C. Ignore the Intent of the Founders
Another approach that can be taken is to simply ignore the intent
of the Founders in determining the constitutionality of the regulatory
takings doctrine. There is a myriad of ways in which the Constitution can
be interpreted including textualism, original meaning, judicial precedent,
pragmaticism, moral reasoning, national identity, structuralism, and his-
torical practices.130 Former Judge Richard Posner even went as far as to
say, “I see absolutely no value to a judge of spending decades, years,
months, weeks, day, hours, minutes, or seconds studying the Constitu-
tion . . . . Eighteenth-century guys, however smart, could not foresee the
culture, technology, etc., of the 21st century.”131
The intent of the Founding Fathers is of paramount importance
for an interpretation under original meaning and a broad use of histori-
cal practices.132 Textualism and structuralism would also be in favor of
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regulatory takings under tier one and tier two of the analysis in Part II.133
This still leaves the pragmatism, moral reasoning, and national identity
arguments, as well as a more narrow view of historical practice and judicial
precedent.134 The world has changed a lot since the time of the drafting
of the Constitution. Perhaps like in Atkins v. Virginia, there is an “evolving
standard of decency” for property rights when weighed against environ-
mental concerns.135
Ultimately, this may be the most dangerous approach to the issue
of regulatory takings. While there are various means of interpretation,
blatantly ignoring a strong position in one, even if for a good reason, may
lead to less consistent federal laws and reduce the legitimacy of the court
over time. As the great Julius Caesar once said, “All precedents produc-
tive of evil effects have had their origin from what was good.”136
CONCLUSION
The notion of property rights has been around since Henry II began
Anglo-American jurisprudence with reference to the Domesday Book.137
With the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 by King John I, these rights
were deemed so important as to be beyond even the power of the king to
violate.138 These limitations on the sovereign included the article, “No
constable or his bailiff is to take . . . chattels from anyone . . . unless the
constable or his bailiff immediately offers money in payment of obtains
a respite by the wish of the seller.”139 Five-hundred-seventy-six years later
James Madison would recodify this rule into the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which reads, “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”140
The goal of this Note is to analyze how this ancient rule fits into
our modern world and the need for regulating land use for the sake of the
environment. Using Blackstone’s system of analysis to try to surmise the
will of the Founders reflects a strong support of land rights and opposi-
tion to their uncompensated regulation.141 Tier one supports regulatory
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takings as it deduced that the plain meaning of the Takings Clause ex-
tending to both physical confiscation and a reduction in the power of the
landowner to determine the use of their land.142 Tier two more tentatively
supports it, since liberty, the classical view of justice, and a preference
for negative rights would favor limiting government action.143 General
welfare and a more modern interpretation of justice would weigh against
regulatory takings.144 Tier three reflects a desire to oppose strong govern-
ment and uphold traditional common law rights and would thus support
regulatory takings.145 Tier four is of little use in the interpretation at hand
and can be dismissed as it is impossible to know whether modern takings
would be seen as an absurd use of the clause.146 Tier five is the most per-
missive and reflects numerous equitable exceptions in the Takings Clause;
however, Blackstone warns of its overuse.147
It seems clear with three in favor, one abstaining, and one that
depends upon the particular case, that the Fifth Amendment would re-
quire compensation for regulation which seriously devalues one’s prop-
erty.148 Environmental law can be more cautious going forward, act more
through proxies in tort suits, or try to argue alternative interpretations of
the rule; but, ultimately if an individual’s property is adversely affected
enough, they would have to be paid. This may be a potential roadblock for
environmental regulation in the future, but it is a necessary part of the pre-
cocious balancing act between individual liberties and the good of society.
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